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COMMENTS
THE ABSENCE OF FALSE LIGHT FROM THE
WISCONSIN PRIVACY STATUTE
I. INTRODUCTION
When the Wisconsin Legislature enacted this state's first
privacy law on November 29, 1977, the statute did not pro-
vide a cause of action for placing a person in a false light in
the public eye.' "False light in the public eye" is a metaphor
for deceptive publicity which blinds the audience to the sub-
1. Right of Privacy Act, ch. 176, § 5, 1977 Wis. Laws 756 (codified at Wis. STAT.
§ 895.50 (1979)), which provides:
Right of privacy. (1) The right of privacy is recognized in this state. One
whose privacy is unreasonably invaded is entitled to the following relief:
(a) Equitable relief to prevent and restrain such invasion, excluding prior
restraint against constitutionally protected communication privately and
through the public media;
(b) Compensatory damages based either on plaintifis loss or defendant's
unjust enrichment; and
(c) A reasonable amount for attorney fees.
(2) In this section, "invasion of privacy" means any of the following:
(a) Intrusion upon the privacy of another of a nature highly offensive to a
reasonable person, in a place that a reasonable person would consider private
or in a manner which is actionable for trespass.
(b) The use, for advertising purposes or for purposes of trade, of the
name, portrait or picture of any living person, without having first obtained the
written consent of the person or, if the person is a minor, of his or her parent or
guardian.
(c) Publicity given to a matter concerning the private life of another, of a
kind highly offensive to a reasonable person, if the defendant has acted either
unreasonably or recklessly as to whether there was a legitimate public interest
in the matter involved, or with actual knowledge that none existed. It is not an
invasion of privacy to communicate any information available to the public as
a matter of public record.
(3) The right of privacy recognized in this section shall be interpreted in
accordance with the developing common law of privacy, including defenses of
absolute and qualified privilege, with due regard for maintaining freedom of
communication, privately and through the public media.
(4) Compensatory damages are not limited to damages for pecuniary loss,
but shall not be presumed in the absence of proof.
(6)(a) If judgment is entered in favor of the defendant in an action for
invasion of privacy, the court shall determine if the action was frivolous. If the
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ject's true identity. By definition, the wrong done in such
cases must be at least twofold. First, there is the falsification,
whether negligent or intentional, of some matter of fact or
opinion attributed to an identified individual. In this re-
spect, he or she has simply been misrepresented, for
whatever purpose. Second is the light itself, the unwanted
illumination of the identified individual before the public at
large.
False light first appeared in the law in 1816 when the
poet Lord Byron enjoined the circulation of a poem attrib-
uted to him but written by another.4  Besides false attribu-
tion, false light actions have also been brought for inclusion
of the plaintiff's name or likeness in a rogue's gallery when
he had not been convicted of a crime;5 for embellishment,
where a photograph or quotation was placed in a distorted
context; 6 and for fictionalization, where a story included ref-
erences to real people either as disguised characters or as
themselves.7
False light is notable for its absence in the Wisconsin
statutory scheme because it is one of the four ways of invad-
court determines that the action was frivolous, it shall award the defendant
reasonable fees and costs relating to the defense of the action.
(b) In order to find an action for invasion of privacy to be frivolous under
par. (a), the court must find either of the following:
1. The action was commenced in bad faith or for harassment purposes.
2. The action was devoid of arguable basis in law or equity.
(7) No action for invasion of privacy may be maintained under this sec-
tion if the claim is based on an act which is permissible under ss. 968.27 to
968.33.
2. See Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 233, 255 (1977).
3. Id
4. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 398 (1960) (citing Lord Byron v. John-
ston, 2 Mer. 29, 35 Eng. Rep. 851 (1816)).
5. See, e.g., Logan v. District of Columbia, 447 F. Supp. 1328 (D.D.C. 1978)
(plaintiff applied for job as hit man for what turned out to be a police undercover
fencing operation; later, doctors breached confidentiality and erroneously listed him
as drug user).
6. See, e.g., Varnish v. Best Medium Publishing Co., 405 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1968)
(portion of suicide note omitted from newspaper account), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987
(1969).
7. See, e.g., Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543, 274
N.Y.S.2d 877 (1966),judgrment vacated and case remanded, 387 U.S. 239, amended, 20
N.Y.2d 752, 229 N.E.2d 712, 283 N.Y.S.2d 119, affid, 21 N.Y.2d 124, 233 N.E.2d 840,
286 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 1046 (1969).
[Vol. 66:99
FALSE LIGHT
ing a plaintiffs privacy identified by Dean Prosser8 and
listed in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.9 The Wisconsin
Legislature did adopt the other three categories, which in-
clude: (1) intrusion upon the plaintiffs seclusion or solitude,
or into his private affairs; (2) appropriation for the defend-
ant's advantage of the plaintiff's name or likeness; and
(3) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the
plaintiff.'0
The Wisconsin Senate deleted a false light provision
when it passed section 895.50,1" and two subsequent at-
tempts to reinstate it were also met with defeat,' 2 due in part
to vigorous opposition from the state's communications me-
dia. 13  Yet the possibility remains that this proposal might
arise again in the Wisconsin Legislature, which over the
course of twenty years turned aside four opportunities to de-
clare any right of privacy at all. 14 It is also probable that
plaintiffs will continue to pursue false light claims under the
common law, even though the legislature specifically refused
to recognize this tort. False light is already recognized as a
tort in the majority of jurisdictions 5 and could serve as the
8. Prosser, supra note 4, at 389.
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A, at 376 (1977).
10. Wis. STAT. § 895.50(2) (1979) (emphasis added).
11. Senate Amend. I to Wis. A!B. 216 (1977).
12. Wis. A.B. 1224 (1979); Wis. A.B. 40 (1981).
13. For accounts of the legislative history of this privacy legislation, see generally
Comment, The Tort of Misappropriation of Name or Likeness Under WisconsinS Pri-
vacy Law, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 1029; J. Eakins, A Privacy Law for Wisconsin: The
Role of the Press (1976) (unpublished thesis for Master of Arts, in University of Wis-
consin Memorial Library and Marquette Law Review office); P. Salsini, Wisconsin's
Right to Privacy Law: The Long Road to Enactment, the Path Still Ahead (Decem-
ber, 1981) (unpublished manuscript in Marquette Law Review office).
14. Wis. S.B. 215 (1951); Wis. S.B. 527 (1952); Wis. A.B. 1165 (1973); Wis. A.B.
232 (1975).
15. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 804 (4th ed.
1971); Prosser, supra note 4, at 386-88. By 1971 Prosser determined that Nebraska,
Rhode Island, Texas and Wisconsin were the only states specifically refusing to recog-
nize a right to privacy. Nebraska, Rhode Island and Wisconsin now have statutes
granting the right. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-201 to -211 (Supp. 1980); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 9-1-28.1 (Supp. 1981); Wis. STAT. § 895.50 (1979). Texas recognized invasion of
privacy as a cause of action in Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1973). This
is not to say that each state has specifically addressed the issue of false light, but none
of the common-law states has refused to do so when it has been presented. Most of
these jurisdictions simply adopt the Prosser-Restatement listing of possible privacy
actions. See, eg., Dresbach v. Doubleday & Co., Inc., 518 F. Supp. 1285, 1287
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basis for a federal diversity suit involving a Wisconsin
party16 when the law of the other state applies.' 7 This com-
ment, therefore, will explore the nature and development of
false light invasion of privacy to determine whether this
aforementioned gap in Wisconsin's law needs filling. It will
consider whether it needs filling in view of the already avail-
able alternative remedies and in view of the competing inter-
ests at stake. To this end it will be helpful in this
consideration of false light to examine, at the outset, the
right of privacy in general.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE TORT OF INVASION OF PRIVACY
A. The Warren and Brandeis Proposal
Louis D. Brandeis and his former law partner, Samuel
D. Warren, bestowed legal recognition on the right to pri-
vacy in an article' "regarded as the outstanding example of
the influence of legal periodicals upon the American law."' 9
The authors borrowed the description "the right to be let
alone" from a torts text2 ° and advocated allowing a cause of
action for inflicting mental distress by publicizing facts or
fiction about the private lives of private citizens. The pair
particularly deplored the use of "numerous mechanical de-
vices" which gave newspapers the capacity to proclaim from
the housetops "what is whispered in the closet."' 2' Brandeis'
authorized biographer relates that the impetus for the article
was what the two Bostonians considered the untoward inter-
est of the local press in the marriage and social life of Mr.
Warren and his bride.22 The article itself did not refer to
these personal grievances. Instead, it invoked protection for
"man's spiritual nature," his "feelings" and his "intellect. 23
(D.D.C. 1981); McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882
(Ky. 1981) (per curiam).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976).
17. See infra note 57.
18. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
19. Prosser, supra note 4, at 383.
20. T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888).
21. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 18, at 195.
22. A. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 70 (1956).
23. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 18, at 193.
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This high minded assault on "yellow journalism ' 24 in the
pages of the already prestigious Harvard Law Review, which
Brandeis had recently helped found, was generally well re-
ceived in legal circles.25 Some latter day commentators,
however, criticize the article and the tort itself as the petty
product of an overweening sense of Victorian prudery.26
Professor Kalven wonders "if the tort is not an anachronism,
a nineteenth century response to the mass press which is
hardly in keeping with the more robust tastes or mores of
today.127 As the reporting of the breakup of another mar-
riage over eighty years later in Time, Inc. v. Firestone28 will
illustrate, however, the passage of decades has not dulled the
desire of some to keep false reports of their homelives out of
the public eye.
Prior to the publication of Warren and Brandeis' article
in 1890, no state had enacted a statutory right to privacy nor
had any American or English court granted relief expressly
based on a violation of such a right.29 New York became the
first state to do so in 1903 by passing a law which made it
both a misdemeanor and a tort to make use of the name,
portrait or picture of any person for trade purposes without
written consent.30  Two years later the Georgia Supreme
Court recognized the right of privacy in a case involving
false light and appropriation, where an insurance company
used the plaintiffs picture without permission along with a
spurious testimonial.3' Subsequently, judicial decisions in
24. For a definition of "yellow journalism," see F. MOT, AMERICAN JOURNAL-
isM: A HISTORY: 1690-1960, 538-41 (3d ed. 1962).
25. See W. PROSSER, supra note 15, § 117, at 802. Prosser also concluded that
"no other tort has received such an outpouring of comment in advocacy of its bare
existence." Id at 802-03.
26. See, e.g., Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?,
31 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 326 (1966).
27. Id at 328-29. Indeed, one of the principal cases upon which Warren and
Brandeis rely involved Queen Victoria's consort, Prince Albert, who brought suit
when copies of etchings he made for his own amusement were included in a display.
The court found a wrongful appropriation. Prince Albert v. Strange, 2 De G. & Sm.
652,41 Eng. Rep. 1171, 1 Mac. & G. 25, 64 Eng. Rep. 293 (1849).
28. 424 U.S. 448 (1976). See infra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
29. W. PROSSER, supra note 15, § 117, at 802.
30. 1903 N.Y. Laws 308, ch. 132, §§ 1-2 (codified as amended at N.Y. Civ.
RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1979 & Supp. 1981-1982)).
31. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
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many states began to give legal effect to the newly recog-
nized right through opinions grounded on either common
law,32 constitutional mandate33 or even natural law.34
B. Current Positions on Privacy
As this body of decisional law accumulated, three diver-
gent views of privacy developed through exposition in legal
scholarship. Foremost among these is Dean Prosser's
description of the four separate torts which fall under the
rubric of invasion of privacy.35  Opposed to his view are
those who see invasion of privacy as a unified tort protecting
a single interest.36 Still others doubt that invasion of privacy
should exist as an independent cause of action at all.37
This theoretical debate has its ramifications on a practi-
cal level because the nature of the interest or interests pro-
tected determines the elements of the tort and the available
defenses. These factors then enter into the complex process
of weighing and balancing the conflicting interests which the
courts and legislatures undertake in devising remedies.
1. Prosser's Four-Part Analysis
By 1960 Dean Prosser had gathered over three hundred
reported cases from throughout the United States and organ-
ized them into the four categories of false light, disclosure,
intrusion and appropriation.38 He determined that privacy is
a composite right in which three interests of the plaintiff are
at stake. Actions for false light and public disclosure protect
32. See, e.g., Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Or. 482, 113 P.2d 438 (1941).
Recognizing a common-law right of privacy in this case, the Oregon Supreme Court
stated: "The common law's capacity to discover and apply remedies for acknowl-
edged wrongs without waiting on legislation is one of its cardinal virtues." Id at-,
113 P.2d at 447.
33. CAL. CONsT. art. I § 1, has been one basis upon which California courts rec-
ognize a right to privacy. See, e.g., Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, -, 297 P. 91,
93 (1931).
34. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, -, 50 S.E. 68, 69-70
(1905) (holding that "It]he right of privacy has its foundation in the instincts of nature
.... A right of privacy in matters purely private is therefore derived from natural
law.").
35. See infra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 45-59 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
38. Prosser, supra note 4, at 388-89.
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an interest in reputation;3 9 those for intrusion protect the in-
terest in freedom from mental distress; 40 and those for ap-
propriation protect a proprietary interest in name and
likeness.4' In his study, which was later incorporated into
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 42 Prosser does not define
privacy but merely describes four ways in which it can be
invaded. He contends that these four types of invasion are
"tied together by the common name [privacy] but otherwise
have almost nothing in common. . . .,4 Yet, he maintains
that "almost all of the confusion is due to a failure to sepa-
rate and distinguish these four forms of invasion, and to re-
alize that they call for different things.""
2. The Unified Tort Theory
Other commentators criticize this analysis on the ground
that Prosser's composite view has itself generated much of
the uncertainty and confusion now surrounding the field.45
In general, they regard the Prosser position as an intermedi-
ate stage in the evolution of the right of privacy which
should now move in the direction of a unified theory, a the-
ory identifying only one fundamental interest.4 6 A leading
partisan of this idea, Edward Bloustein, maintains that "the
39. Id at 398-400.
40. Id at 392.
41. Id at 406.
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-652I, at 376-403 (1977).
43. Prosser, supra note 4, at 389.
44. Id at 407.
45. See, e.g., Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity An Answer to
Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1000 (1964).
46. See M. ERNST & A. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY: THE RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE 51-
52 (1962); A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967); Bloustein, supra note 45, at
962-1007; Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law and the Constitution: Is Warren and Brandeis'
Tort Petty and Unconstitutional as Well?, 46 TEx. L. REV. 611 (1968); Bloustein, The
First Amendment and Privacy: The Supreme Court Justice and the Philosopher, 28
RUTGERS L. REV. 41, 52 (1974); Gerety, supra note 2, at 236-37; Gross, The Concept of
Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 34, 46-51 (1967); Lusky, Invasion of Privacy: .4 Clar/ica-
tion of Concepts, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 693, 709 (1972); Nimmer, The Right to Speak
from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to
Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935, 958-59 (1968); Comment, Privacy, Defamation, and
the First Amendment: The Implication of Time, Inc. v. Hill, 67 COLUNM. L. REV. 926
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Privacy, Defamation]; Comment, Privacy: The
Searchfor a Standard, 11 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 659, 669-70 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Comment, The Search].
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disorder in the cases and commentary offends the primary
canon of all science that a single general principle of expla-
nation is to be preferred over congeries of discrete rules. 47
Warren and Brandeis did not define privacy either, appar-
ently believing the term to be self-explanatory. Yet many
now involved in the legal system complain that "[w]e share a
common intuition of [the] right but are without any ade-
quate and agreed upon definition or delineation of it. We
have no way to know it when we see it.'48
The definitions formulated by the unified theorists are all
quite abstract, owing to the mental rather than physical na-
ture of the tort. Bloustein suggests that "all of the tort pri-
vacy cases involve the same interest in preserving human
dignity and individuality. .. . Others call privacy "the
condition enjoyed by one who can control the communica-
tion of information about himself' '50 or "the voluntary and
temporary withdrawal of a person from the general society
through physical or psychological means."' 51 These writers
align their theories with Warren and Brandeis' concept of
privacy as protecting the "inviolate personality, '5 2 a term
Justice Brandeis described more fully after he ascended to
the Supreme Court:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure condi-
tions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recog-
nized the significance of man's spiritual nature,, of his
feelings and of his intellect .... They sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions
and their sensations. They conferred as against the govern-
47. Bloustein, supra note 45, at 963. Bloustein also states that:
The study and understanding of law, like any other study, proceeds by way
of generalization and simplification. To the degree that relief in the law courts
under two different sets of circumstances can be explained by a common rule
or principle, to that degree the law has achieved greater unity and has become
a more satisfying and useful tool of understanding. Conceptual unity is not
only fulfilling in itself, however, it is also an instrument of legal development.
Id at 1004.
48. Gerety, supra note 2, at 244 (paraphrasing Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S 184,
197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
49. Bloustein, supra note 45, at 1005.
50. Lusky, supra note 46, at 709.
51. A. WESTIN, spra note 46, at 7.
52. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 18, at 205.
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ment, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men.53
In addition to advocating a unified theory of privacy,
some commentators, such as Judge Skelly Wright, go so far
as to call for a national law of privacy with liability insur-
ance funded by the government 4 Judge Wright believes
that a federal cause of action for invasion of privacy by pub-
lication can properly be grounded on the first amendment or
the commerce clause;55 but neither of these provisions is self-
executing in regard to an individual-hence the need for a
federal law. He also maintains that national legislation is
necessary because of the interstate structure of the communi-
cations industry, which is frequently a defendant in a pri-
vacy case.56 When brought as diversity actions, these suits
usually raise conflict of laws issues57 and could subject the
defendant to litigation simultaneously in several jurisdic-
tions with each having its own network of doctrine. Given
the current Supreme Court's opposition to the development
of a body of federal tort law,58 a national law of privacy
seems highly improbable at this point. However, similar fac-
tors of uncertainty and unmanageability are now prompting
the drafting of a national law of products liability.5 9
3. The Unneeded Tort Theory
Another body of legal opinion rejects both the composite
and the unified theories by maintaining that there is no need
for a separate tort of invasion of privacy. 60 Frederick Davis
53. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
54. Wright, Defamation, Privacy, and the Public's Right to Know: A National
Problem and a New ,4pproach, 46 TEx. L. REV. 630, 643 (1968). See also Beytagh,
Privacy and a Free Press: 4 Contemporary Conflict in Values, 20 N.Y.L. FORUM 453,
501, 508-09 (1975); Shapo, Media Injuries to Personality: An Essay on Legal Regula-
tion of Public Communication, 46 TEX. L. REv. 650, 665 (1968); Comment, The
Search, supra note 46, at 668-69 (for other suggestions for a uniform privacy law).
55. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
56. Wright, supra note 54, at 64449.
57. See generally Lelflar, Choice of Law: Torts: Current Trends, 6 VAND. L. REV.
447, 453-58 (1953); Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REv. 959 (1953).
58. Kirby, Demoting 14th Amendment Claims to State Torts, 68 A.B.A. J. 166, 167
(1982).
59. S. 2631, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REc. 6878 (1982).
60. Davis, What Do We Mean by 'Right to Privacy", 4 S.D. L. REv. 1 (1959);
Kalven, supra note 24, at 327-28; Pember & Teeter, Privacy and the Press Since Time,
Inc. v. Hill, 50 WASH. L. REv. 57, 90-91 (1974).
1982]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
dismisses privacy as merely "a sociological notion and not a
jural concept at all. ' 61 In his estimation already existing ac-
tions for expropriation of property rights in personality or
for infliction of mental distress could just as well provide re-
lief for the wrongs listed by Prosser.62
Privacy could even be absorbed into a more comprehen-
sive cause of action,63 just as the ancient common-law action
for deceit was subsumed into the broader tort of misrepre-
sentation. Dean Wade believes that:
[Tihere is real reason to conclude that the principle behind
the law of privacy is much broader than the idea of privacy
itself, and that the whole law of privacy will become a part
of the larger tort of intentional infliction of mental suffer-
ing. That tort would then absorb established torts like as-
sault and defamation and invasion of the right of privacy
and join them together with other innominate torts to con-
stitute a single, integrated system of protecting plaintiffs
peace of mind against acts of the defendant intended to
disturb it.64
Such predictions about the future course of privacy law
spur debates in the law reviews, but the present state of the
law seems to be dominated by the Prosser position.65 Kalven
explains that "given the legal mind's weakness for neat la-
bels and categories and given the deserved Prosser prestige,
it is a safe prediction that the fourfold view will come to
dominate whatever thinking is done about the right of pri-
vacy in the future. '66
III. PRIVACY AND FALSE LIGHT IN WISCONSIN
4. No Common-Law Right
Prior to 1977 none of these developments in the law of
privacy had any practical application in Wisconsin courts
61. Davis, supra note 60, at 19.
62. Id at 22-23.
63. Pember & Teeter, supra note 60, at 90-91; wade, Defamation and the Right of
Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REv. 1093, 1124-25 (1962).
64. Wade, supra note 63, at 1124-25.
65. A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, AND
DOSSIERS 173 (1971); Kalven, supra note 26, at 332; Pember & Teeter, supra note 60,
at 91.
66. Kalven, supra note 26, at 332.
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because they steadfastly refused to recognize such a com-
mon-law right in the absence of legislative mandate. The
first Wisconsin Supreme Court case to raise the privacy issue
was Klug v. Sherifs67 in 1906, where the plaintiff brought
suit against an artist for painting an unauthorized portrait of
his deceased wife. Sidestepping the privacy issue, the court
granted relief on a contract theory.68 Thirty years later in
Judevine v. Benzies-Montanye Fuel & Wholesale Co.,69 a
Baraboo carpenter sued on several grounds, including inva-
sion of privacy, because the defendant had distributed or-
ange handbills offering to sell the accounts of Judevine and
several others to the highest bidder. The plaintiff, who owed
a bill of $4.32, alleged that this falsely implied he was a
"dead-beat."70 This time the court addressed the privacy is-
sue directly, saying that "it is more fitting that [the right of
privacy] be created by the legislature by declaring unlawful
such acts as it deems an unwarranted infringement of that
right."7'
B. Legislative History
Wisconsin legislators did not begin to respond to this call
for action for another fifteen years,72 and, when they did re-
spond, it took another twenty-six years for a bill to come to
fruition.73 The legislative history of the various privacy pro-
posals during this time span reveals a persistent split of opin-
ion among the lawmakers as to whether Wisconsin should
have a narrow statute covering only specific areas or whether
a broadly phrased law granting a generalized right was
67. 129 Wis. 468, 109 N.W. 656 (1906).
68. Id at 474-75, 109 N.W. at 658.
69. 222 Wis. 512, 269 N.W. 295 (1936).
70. Id at 516, 269 N.W. at 298.
71. Id at 527, 269 N.W. at 302.
72. The Judevine decision had the effect of putting potential plaintiffs on notice,
however, for only one reported case during that 15 year period attempted to resurrect
the issue of privacy. See State ex rel Distenfeld v. Neelen, 255 Wis. 214, 218, 38
N.W.2d 703, 704-05 (1949).
73. For accounts of the history of privacy legislation in Wisconsin, see generally
Comment, The Right of Privacy, 1952 Wis. L. REv. 507; Comment, supra note 13;
Note, The Right of Privacy in Wlisconsin, 1961 Wis. L. REv. 332; L. Barish, Privacy:
Its Substance, Applications and Legal Status (1972) (unpublished Wisconsin Legisla-
tive Reference Research Bull. No. 723, Madison, Wis.); J. Eakins, supra note 13; P.
Salsini, supra note 13.
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needed. This dichotomy parallels the controversy, noted
above,74 between Prosser's partisans, who see privacy as a
composite of four separable torts, and those who view it as a
unity. A recounting of the amending process will also show
the forces and compromises which led to deleting the false
light provision. Because section 895.50 is still virtually
uninterpreted by the state courts,7 5 a summary of the legisla-
tive history which preceded its passage will provide a useful
guide to legislative intent, which can serve as a tool for statu-
tory analysis. 6
This law's long road to enactment began in 1951 when
State Senator Warren P. Knowles introduced a bill recogniz-
ing a general right to privacy.77 Faced with opposition from
the press and credit reporting agencies, 78 he later amended
his bill to cover only situations where (1) an advertiser ap-
propriated a person's name or likeness without permission;
(2) a creditor published the names of debtors; or (3) one per-
son purported to represent another or a firm without permis-
sion.79 After carving out certain exceptions for collection
agencies and the press, the senate passed this bill8° and an
identical bill which Knowles introduced in the 1953 ses-
sion,81 but the assembly defeated the measure both times.82
Wisconsin citizens were still without a remedy for inva-
sion of privacy in 1956, when a particularly outrageous event
gave rise to the case of Yoeckel v. Samonig.83 There, the pro-
prietor of Sad Sam's Tavern in the town of Delafield photo-
graphed the plaintiff using the women's rest room and
displayed the picture to other patrons in his establishment.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 35-66.
75. See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
76. See McGarrity v. Welch Plumbing Co., 104 Wis. 2d 414, 425 (1981) ("Legis-
lative intent may be ascertained by an examination of the words of the rule in relation
to the scope, history and subject matter of the rule and the object intended to be
accomplished or the will to be remedied by the rule.").
77. Wis. S.B. 215 (1951) ("The legal right of privacy is recognized in this state
and an invasion thereof shall give rise to an equitable action to recover damages for
injuries sustained by reason thereof.").
78. See J. Eakins, supra note 13, at 103-06.
79. S. Substitute Amend. 1 to Wis. S.B. 215 (1951).
80. S. Substitute Amend. 2 to Wis. S.B. 215 (1951).
81. Wis. S.B. 537 (1953).
82. See J. Eakins, supra note 13, at 112, 127-28.
83. 272 Wis. 430, 75 N.W.2d 925 (1956).
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court dismissed the claim in a deci-
sion Prosser calls "an atrocity. '8 4 Since the photograph was
not used for advertising purposes, the Knowles bill would
not have provided relief either; still, the legislature, un-
moved, declined to consider a privacy bill in any form until
1973.
In 1972 several University of Wisconsin law students,
having learned that Wisconsin did not recognize a right of
privacy, persuaded Assemblyman R. Michael Ferrall to in-
troduce a bill offering broad privacy protection.8 5 The sen-
ate failed to take action on the measure, so it died when the
session ended. Two years later Ferrall reintroduced his
bill,86 and this time the media mounted a strong opposition.
Their chief objection was that, since privacy was not defined
in the bill, its coverage would be either too vague or over-
broad. 87 After more maneuvering the two sides worked out
a compromise amendment which basically listed Prosser's
four categories (including false light). This amendment also
eliminated exemplary (punitive) damages and allowed an
action for false light only upon a showing of knowledge or
reckless disregard for the truth.88 Meanwhile, Assembly Ma-
jority Leader Terry Willkom worked with the press on an-
other substitute amendment which entirely deleted the false
light category.89 The assembly failed to vote on either the
bill or the amendments before the session ended on March
31, 1976, so again the legislation expired.90
Much the same scenario occurred in 1977 when Ferrall
reintroduced his generalized privacy bill9' and then compro-
mised on a more specific draft.92 Ferrall pushed to include
false light in the assembly version of the bill, but it was de-
leted by the senate.93 This time, however, both houses of the
84. Prosser, supra note 4, at 388 n.58.
85. Wis. A.B. 1165 (1973); see J. Eakins, supra note 13, at 150-51.
86. Wis. A.B. 232 (1975); see J. Eakins, supra note 13, at 181.
87. See J. Eakins, supra note 13, at 181-218.
88. A. Substitute Amend. 1 to Wis. A.B. 232 (1975).
89. A. Substitute Amend. 2 to Wis. A.B. 232 (1975).
90. J. Eakins, supra note 13, at 200.
91. Wis. A.B. 216 (1977).
92. A. Substitute Amend. 1 to Wis. A.B. 216 (1977).
93. S. Amend. 9 to Wis. A.B. 216 (1977).
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legislature approved the amended bill and it became law on
November 29, 1977. 94
C Section 895.50
The privacy bill finally enacted by the Wisconsin Legis-
lature is a hybrid piece of legislation reflecting the com-
promises which enabled its passage. This law specifically
limits the right of privacy to three of the four categories de-
scribed by Prosser 96 and the Restatement (Second) of Torts97
with a few variations. Section 895.50 covers:
(1) Intrusion. In Wisconsin intrusion is actionable if it
would be "highly offensive to a reasonable person."98 Ac-
cording to the Restatement the intrusion must be inten-
tional,99 but in Wisconsin it may also be negligent "or in a
manner which is actionable for trespass."1
(2) Appropriation. A plaintiff can press a complaint for
appropriation in Wisconsin if his name or likeness is used
for commercial purposes without written consent.' 0' The Re-
statement does not limit claims to commercial appropriation
or appropriation for pecuniary benefit, but would allow an
action for any unauthorized use for the purposes and benefit
of the defendant so long as it is not merely incidental. 102
(3) Disclosure. The final action allowed by the statute
is for "publicity"'' 0 3 given to a "matter concerning the private
life of another, of a kind highly offensive to a reasonable
person." 4 Both this statute and the Restatement note that
94. 1977 Wis. Laws 756, ch. 176, § 5 (codified at Wis. STAT. § 895.50 (1979)); see
supra note 1 for text.
95. See P. Salsini, supra note 13, at Exhibit A, which says that the drafters of the
bill were surprised when the author pointed out that there is no subsection (5) in the
law. They explained to Salsini that the bill's sections were renumbered in the various
stages of rewriting and that no one noticed the dropped number. They said that all of
the sections that belong in the law are there.
96. See Prosser, supra note 4, at 389.
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B, at 378 (1977).
98. Wis. STAT. § 895.50(2)(a) (1979).
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B, at 378 (1977).
100. Wis. STAT. § 895.50(2)(a) (1979).
101. Wis. STAT. § 895.50(2)(b) (1979).
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C comments b & d (1977).
103. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment a (1977), which
defines "publicity" as a matter communicated to so many people that it is certain to
become public knowledge.
104. Wis. STAT. § 895.50(2)(c) (1979).
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there is no liability for publishing information available to
the public as a matter of public record. 05 The Wisconsin test
for liability focuses on the "newsworthiness"1 6 of the matter
disclosed and the Restatement similarly speaks of matters of
"legitimate public concern."'10 7 Under the Wisconsin statute
the disclosure may be either negligent, reckless or inten-
tional. This makes invasion of privacy along with defama-
tion and nuisance the only torts in Wisconsin subject to this
triple standard of conduct since recklessness was eliminated
from the negligence calculus for compensatory damages. 08
Including disclosure while excluding false light from this
statute results in the illogical situation of allowing an action
for the revelation of true intimate facts while disallowing
one for revealing intimate matters which turn out to be un-
true. Professor Nimmer points out that this puts a premium
on falsity so far as the defendant is concerned. 0 9 While
statements need not be of an intimate nature to put one in a
false light, they very often are. 0 Nimmer maintains that the
"false light cases are. . . a logical, even a necessary, exten-
sion of the private facts cases . . . ."I If false light is in-
deed a logical and necessary addition to Wisconsin's privacy
protection, then recognition must come either from the
courts by adoption of the common-law doctrine, or from the
legislature, by amendment of the statute.
105. Id; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment d (1977). This Re-
statement section reflects the decision in Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469
(1975), which held that states may not impose sanctions for the publication of truthful
information contained in official court records open to public inspection. Id at 493-
96.
106. Wis. STAT. § 895.50(2)(c) (1979). See also Brody, Invasion ofPrivacy in Wis-
consin, Milwaukee Law., Summer 1978, at I1, 21 (for an explanation of
"newsworthiness").
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comments d & g (1977).
108. See Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 14-19, 114 N.W.2d 105, 111-14 (1962).
But see Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 275, 294 N.W.2d 437, 446 (1980)
(stating that "[w]e do not read Blelski as holding that 'outrageous' conduct, which
may also fit the description of 'gross negligence,' has no place in determining the
existence of liability for punitive damages . .
109. Nimmer, supra note 46, at 963.
110. Cf. id at 964 n.97 (suggesting one standard for false light statements regard-
ing private matters and another for false light statements about public matters).
I 11. Id at 963.
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1. Considerations for Court Interpretation
A false light claim may be brought to judicial attention
because of the frequent intermingling of Prosser's four pri-
vacy torts in a single factual situation. Truth is a defense to
false light, while it is not in other privacy actions; but in
other respects the categories can and do overlap. False light
is like disclosure in that it requires publication to a large
group. Thus, when revelations of true intimate facts are
mixed with fabrications, both false light and public disclo-
sure are involved."12  If the facts are gathered by means of
trespass or eavesdropping, then a cause of action for intru-
sion would also arise. 1 3 Similarly, when a person's name is
used without permission to advertise a commercial product,
a colorable claim for appropriation can arise; and if it is a
product which would be out of character for the plaintiff to
use, that plaintiff could also seek a remedy for false light. 14
Therefore, in situations where more than one type of privacy
violation has occurred, a Wisconsin plaintiff could make a
false light claim if only to serve as an aggravating factor.
This overlapping and blurring of the categories leads to
confusion as to which label to apply. It is one reason why
many legal scholars call for a unified, single tort theory of
privacy. 1-5 On the other hand, opponents of false light legis-
lation fear any such broadening of the statute's coverage by
the courts. They insist that the law be confined to its explicit
provisions with as little latitude for judicial interpretation as
possible." 6
112. See, e.g., Logan v. District of Columbia, 447 F. Supp. 1328 (D.D.C. 1978)
(concerning reports issued from physician's confidential records).
113. See, e.g., Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 276 Ala. 380, 162 So. 2d 474
(1964) (hidden photographer took picture at fun house of plaintiff with skirt blown
over her head; the published photo allegedly placed her character in question).
114. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 112 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905)
(name, picture and false statement used to endorse life insurance which plaintiff did
not buy).
115. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
116. See Brody, supra note 106, at 13. Milwaukee attorney James Patrick Brody
represented the Milwaukee Journal at legislative hearings on Wis. A.B. 216 (1977)
and its amendments. He says that: "The direction to follow the 'common law' obvi-
ously does not permit departure from express statutory terms, but refers only to those
matters not governed by the statute." Id But see Comment, supra note 13, at 1040
(suggesting "inconsistencies in false light cases because this controversial area is part
of the developing common law of privacy").
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In view of the legislature's deliberate rejection of false
light, outright recognition by the courts seems highly un-
likely, even though the Wisconsin Supreme Court may have
the inherent power to do so 117 and even though section
895.50 states that "[tihe right of privacy recognized in this
section shall be interpreted in accordance with the develop-
ing common law of privacy."" 8 Legislative intent, however,
is not the sole criterion for statutory interpretation. Further
guidance as to how the courts might treat a false light claim
can be obtained by examining judicial interpretations in
other jurisdictions where the right to privacy is exclusively
statutory. '19
These laws generally fall into two categories: (1) a broad
unified grant of the right to privacy either in a constitution 120
or in a statute,12' or (2) a more specific law, like Wisconsin's,
limited to one or more of the categories recognized by Pros-
ser. 22 These tort laws exist in addition to other statutes
117. See, e.g., State v. Cannon, 196 Wis. 534, 536-37, 221 N.W. 603, 603-04
(1928), where the opinion discusses inherent powers of the Wisconsin Supreme Court
and quotes with approval In re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 P. 1152 (1918), which
states:
The inherent power of the court is the power to protect itself; thepower to
administerjustice whether anyprevious'form ofremedy had been granted or not;
the power to promulgate rules for its practice; and the power to provide pro-
cess where none exists. It is true that the judicial power of this court was cre-
ated by the constitution, but upon coming into being under the constitution,
this court came into being with inherent powers.
Id at 1153 (emphasis added).
118. Wis. STAT. § 895.50(3) (1979).
119. See, e.g., State v. J.C. Penney Co., 48 Wis. 2d 125, 138, 179 N.W.2d 641,647
(1970), which construes a Wisconsin usury law borrowed from New York. The opin-
ion says that "when the Wisconsin legislature adopted the New York statute it also
adopted the construction placed upon it by the New York courts .... " (citation
omitted).
120. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22; ARiz. CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 1; HAWAII CONST. art. I, § 7; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12; LA. CONST. art. I, § 5; MONT.
CONST. art. II, § 10; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
121. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § lB (West Supp. 1981).
122. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344 (West Supp. 1981) (appropriation); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 540.08 (West 1972) (appropriation); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-701 (Supp. 1981) (intru-
sion); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 511 (Supp. 1981) (intrusion); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 20-201 to -211 (Supp. 1980) (intrusion, appropriation and false light); N.Y. CIv.
RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1979 & Supp. 1981-1982) (appropriation); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 839.1-.2 (West Supp. 1981-1982) (appropriation); R.IL GEN.
LAWS § 9-1-28 (Supp. 1981) (intrusion, appropriation, disclosure and false light);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 45-3-1 to -6 (Supp. 1981) (appropriation); VA. CODE § 18.2-
19821
MAIRQUETTE L4W -REVIEW[o6
(usually criminal) which protect the confidentiality of certain
records. 123
Where a constitutional provision or statute is broadly
worded, the courts have usually allowed a claim for false
light as well as for the other categories. 12 4 As for the limited
statute states, only two specifically enumerate a cause of ac-
tion for false light.125 The others accept or reject such claims
depending upon whether the courts liberally 26 or strictly 127
construe the letter of the law.
Drafters of the Wisconsin statute borrowed the wording
of the New York privacy law 28 for the appropriation subsec-
tion. 29 Despite the facially limited scope of this New York
statute, the courts of that state have expanded it to cover
false light cases by means of the fictionalization approach.
For example, in Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc. 130 a baseball
player sued a publisher for using him as the subject of a
fictionalized biography. Although a lower court found the
216.1 (Supp. 1981) (appropriation); Wis. STAT. § 895.50 (1979) (intrusion, appropria-
tion and disclosure).
123. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 6.80(2)(e) (1979) (secret ballot); § 13.95(l)(g) (state
agency data bank information may be confidential); § 19.85 (meetings of governmen-
tal bodies which may be closed); § 48.396 (juvenile offender records closed); § 48.78
(records of child welfare agencies closed); § 48.93 (adoption records closed);
§ 71.11(44) (tax records confidential); § 118.125-.126 (pupil records and communica-
tions confidential); § 143.07 (venereal disease records confidential); § 146.82 (patient
health care records confidential); § 767.53 (paternity records closed); § 885.365 (re-
cording telephone conversations restricted); § 905.02 (required reports privileged);
§ 905.03 (lawyer-client communications privileged); § 905.05 (husband-wife commu-
nications privileged); § 905.06 (communications to clergyman privileged); § 905.065
(results of honesty testing device test privileged); § 905.07 (political vote privileged);
§ 905.08 (trade secrets privileged); § 905.09 (law enforcement records privileged);
§ 905.10 (identity of informer privileged); § 968.26 (John Doe proceeding confiden-
tial); § 968.27-.33 (interception and disclosure of wire or oral communications prohib-
ited except when authorized).
124. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Scagliotti, 373 Mass. 626, -, 371 N.E.2d 726,
727 (1977).
125. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-201 to -211 (Supp. 1980); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-28.1
(Supp. 1981). It would be premature to draw any conclusions from these two jurisdic-
tions. At this writing no reported cases cite these statutes.
126. See infra text accompanying notes 128-31.
127. See infra text accompanying notes 132-33.
128. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1979 & Supp. 1981-1982).
129. Wis. STAT. § 895.50(2)(b) (1979). See Comment, supra note 13, at 1041.
130. 18 N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1966),judgment vacated
and case remanded, 387 U.S. 239, amended, 20 N.Y.2d 752, 229 N.E.2d 712, 283
N.Y.S.2d 119, qf'd, 21 N.Y.2d 124, 233 N.E.2d 840, 286 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1967), appeal
dismissed, 393 U.S. 1046 (1969).
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book generally laudatory (for example, the false statement
that Spahn was a war hero), the court granted relief based on
material and substantial falsification as well as commercial
misappropriation.'31
Utah's privacy statute 32 is identical in most material re-
spects to New York's, but Utah courts construe it strictly.
The Utah statute applies only to actual advertising or sales
promotion of collateral commodities. It does not apply to
the communications media. 33 Because of the concentration
of the media in New York, it is likely that the courts there
found it expedient to accommodate false light claims under
the appropriation statute on a case-by-case basis. Had they
not done so, there would have been pressure on the legisla-
ture to amend the statute.
2. Considerations for Legislative Action
If Wisconsin courts refrain from recognizing false light
claims, it is still possible that the legislature will amend the
statute to include such a provision. Assemblyman Thomas
Rogers proposed one false light bill in 1979134 which would
have required all plaintiffs to prove that the defendant acted
with knowing or reckless disregard of the truth. The 1981
version of his bill applied this standard only to suits brought
by public personalities. 35 The press vehemently opposed
both these bills and both died in committee. 36 But, like the
privacy bill itself, this false light legislation may someday
succeed after several trial runs. 137
Opponents of false light legislation and scholars who
doubt its efficacy raise at least four objections to it as a tort
action: (1) it would promote a high volume of claims;
(2) these claims tend to be trivial; (3) alternative remedies
131. Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 219, 228, 250 N.Y.S.2d 529, 539
(1964), aff'd, 23 A.D.2d 216, 260 N.Y.S.2d 451 (1965). For the subsequent history of
this case see supra note 130.
132. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 45-3-1 to -6 (Supp. 1981).
133. See generally Jeppson v. United Television, Inc., 580 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1978);
Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distributing Corp., 2 Utah 2d 256, 272 P.2d 177
(1954) (for the only two reported cases construing the Utah statute or its predecessor).
134. Wis. A.B. 1224 (1979).
135. Wis. A.B. 40 (1981).
136. See P. Salsini, supra note 13, at 21-22.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 72-94.
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already exist; and (4) it would have a chilling effect upon
freedom of the press.
a. High Volume of Claims
As for the predicted flood of litigation, the same objec-
tion was lodged against the 1977 privacy bill, 38 but during
the four years following that bill's passage only four re-
ported Wisconsin cases cite the statute. 39 Moreover, only
one of these cases involved the press as a party, and in that
case it was the newspaper which brought suit.140 This scar-
city of cases might validate the contention that the bill was
not needed in the first place.1 4 ' It could also indicate that
most complaints were settled out of court' 42 or that the pub-
lic is not yet claims conscious with regard to privacy in gen-
eral or this statute in particular. 43
138. See P. Salsini, supra note 13, at 14.
139. Joel v. Various John Does, 499 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (appropriation
of singer's name and picture on T-shirts and like merchandise actionable under stat-
ute); Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Sons, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 280 N.W.2d 129 (1979)
(appropriation of athletic director's nickname "Crazylegs" protected by statute and
common law); Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 89 Wis. 2d 417, 279 N.W.2d 179 (1979)
(disclosure of public arrest records not prohibited under statute); Maynard v. City of
Madison, 101 Wis. 2d 273, 304 N.W.2d 163 (Ct. App. 1981) (statute does not make
city immune from suit by informer whose identity was disclosed).
140. Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 89 Wis. 2d 417, 279 N.W.2d 179 (1979).
141. See J. Eakins, supra note 13, at 251-52.
142. Id at 185-86, quoting the editor of the Milwaukee Journal who testified
concerning the proposed privacy legislation that "even without a law the Journal suf-
fers from many claims that the paper has invaded the public's privacj." Yet a check
by this author of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court records for the period of Au-
gust 1978 through July 1982 revealed no large claims (over $1000) filed against the
Journal Company alleging invasion of privacy. See also P. Salsini, supra note 13, at
17-19. Salsini located two lawsuits filed in Dane County, Wisconsin, Circuit Court.
One memorandum decision dismissed a claim against the Milwaukee Sentinel news-
paper because the statute of limitations had run. Hornick v. YWCA, No. 81-CV-2991
(Cir. Ct. Dane Co. filed Oct. 12, 1981). The other suit charged a private individual
with invasion of privacy for listing the plaintiff's address in a "lonely hearts" want ad.
This case was settled out of court. Zimmer v. Gentz, No. 79-CV-5259 (Cir. Ct. Dane
Co. Oct. 10, 1979). It is interesting to note that neither of these complaints explicitly
referred to Wis. STAT. § 895.50 (1979), presumably because of the historical legisla-
tive disfavor of false light. Both made only general reference to invasion of privacy
although in the case against the Sentinel, the plaintiff did allege that the newspaper
profile put her in a "bad light. . . as a person who engages in bizarre behavior."
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint at 2, Hornick v. YWCA, No. 81-CV-2991 (Cir. Ct.
Dane Co. filed Oct. 12, 1981).




The argument against false light involves not only the
quantity of cases which might arise, but also the quality.
Some view false light as the most "unbeatably trivial" cate-
gory of a trivial tort. 44They argue that if a statement is not
outrageous enough to be defamatory, no redress need be al-
lowed under any other theory. 45 Also, if privacy is "the
right to be let alone," then the sincere victim of an unwar-
ranted invasion will not want to invite additional publicity
by bringing a lawsuit. Professor Kalven asserts that "pri-
vacy will recruit claimants inversely to the magnitude of the
offense to privacy involved."' 46 He warns that "those who
will come forward with privacy claims will very often have
shabby, unseemly grievances and an interest in
exploitation." 147
c. Alternative Remedies
Even where there is a legitimate claim, at least two other
remedies for hurt feelings and reputation already exist under
common law. When Warren and Brandeis wrote their arti-
cle there was no independent tort action for infliction of
mental distress. 48  The 1963 case of Alsteen v. Gehl149
marked the acceptance of such an action in Wisconsin, pro-
vided the plaintiff can prove four factors: (1) that the de-
fendant's conduct was intentional; (2) that the conduct was
extreme and outrageous according to community standards;
(3) that the conduct was a cause in fact of the injury; and
(4) that the plaintiff suffered an extreme disabling emotional
response and was unable to function in other relation-
ships. 50 Wisconsin does not apply the recklessness standard
to this tort,' 5' and when the conduct of the defendant is
merely negligent, no recovery can be had for mental distress
144. Kalven, supra note 26, at 337.
145. Id at 340.
146. Id at 338.
147. Id at 339.
148. Franklin, .4 Constitutional Problem in Privacy Protection: Legal Inhibitions
on Reporting of Facts, 16 STAN. L. Rnv. 107, 143 (1963).
149. 21 Wis. 2d 349, 124 N.W.2d 312 (1963).
150. Id at 359-61, 124 N.W.2d at 318.
151. Id at 357-58, 124 N.W.2d at 317.
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alone in the absence of physical injury. 15 2 These are difficult
elements for the plaintiff to prove even in a flagrant case.
The woman in Yoeckel v. Samonig,'5 3 for example, did not
allege any physical consequences of the exhibition of her
picture, so she would have to have proved a specific intent to
inflict emotional distress in order to have prevailed under
this theory.
After Alsteen the Wisconsin Supreme Court did grant re-
lief in Slawek v. Stroh'54 to a woman who alleged that the
admitted father of her illegitimate child invaded her privacy
by harassing phone calls and visits. That court, writing in
1974, said that while Wisconsin does not recognize a cause
of action for invasion of privacy, the plaintiff could recover
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 55
In a false light case the chief harm suffered will likely be
the same hurt feelings, but given the present state of the law,
it would be easier for the plaintiff to collect parasitic dam-
ages stemming from invasion of privacy than to proceed on
a direct theory of infliction of mental distress. The Wiscon-
sin privacy statute allows the additional standard of reckless
conduct,' 56 and it also does not require proof of physical in-
jury, even when negligent conduct is involved.
Some false light victims also have an alternate remedy in
the ancient tort of defamation. Wisconsin has recognized a
cause of action for libel and slander since the adoption of the
Constitution of 1848,: 7 and two statutes now on the books
recognize defamation as both a tort' 58 and a misdemeanor.' 59
Just as false light combines with other categories of privacy,
it also extends into the field of defamation, for both torts
redress false statements. Yet there is a difference in empha-
sis. The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines a defamatory
statement as one which "tends so to harm the reputation of
152. Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 694, 271 N.W.2d 368, 378
(1978).
153. 272 Wis. 430, 75 N.W.2d 925 (1956).
154. 62 Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974).
155. Id at 314-16, 215 N.W.2d at 20-21.
156. Wis. STAT. § 895.50(2)(c) (1979).
157. WIs. CONST. art. I, § 3 (1848).
158. Wis. STAT. § 895.05 (1979).
159. Wis. STAT. §§ 942.01, .03 (1979).
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another as to lower him in the estimation of the community
or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with
him." 160 False light is described as a statement "highly of-
fensive to a reasonable person."' 61 Thus, defamation is
facially more outrageous and is gauged in relation to the ef-
fect on one's occupation or on third persons. The standard
for false light relates more to its effect on the plaintiff himself
as gauged by the reasonable person standard. A statement
putting one in a false light is offensive not only because it is
untrue, but also because it engenders unsought publicity
about some aspect of the plaintiff's life.
Almost all defamatory communications would also put a
person in a false light; but not all communications actiona-
ble as false light need be defamatory. In the same case
either action or both will very often lie; so, although there
can be only one recovery for a wrong, 162 the plaintiff may
proceed on alternate theories. 63 Commentators once be-
lieved that false light would be the preferred claim because it
was a tort without a profile and, hence, was not hampered by
the rigid rules of pleading and privileges encrusted upon def-
amation. 164 Prosser even wondered
whether this branch of the tort is not capable of swallowing
up and engulfing the whole law of public defamation; and
whether there is any false libel printed, for example, in a
newspaper, which cannot be redressed upon the alternative
ground. If that turns out to be the case, it may well be
asked, what of the numerous restrictions and limitations
which have hedged defamation about for many years, in
the interest of freedom of the press and the discouragement
of trivial and extortionate claims? Are they of so little con-
sequence that they may be circumvented in so casual and
cavalier a fashion? 65
Courts and legislatures, however, soon began to impose the
same requirements on false light actions as on defamation
suits. 66
160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559, at 156-58 (1977).
161. Id. § 652E, at 394-400 (1977).
162. W. PROSSER, supra note 15, § 48, at 299-301; Wade, supra note 63, at 1124.
163. See Wade, supra note 63, at 1107.
164. See Kalven, supra note 26, at 339-40; Wade, supra note 57, at 1121.
165. Prosser, supra note 4, at 401.
166. See, e.g., Khaury v. Playboy Publications, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 1342, 1345
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The Wisconsin Legislature has also shown an intent to
treat defamation and privacy equally. The statute of limita-
tion is the same for both - two years when intentional con-
duct is involved.' 67 Also, section 895.50 allows "defenses of
absolute and qualified privilege, with due regard for main-
taining freedom of communication, privately and through
the public media."'' 68 These privileges are presumably to be
imported from the law of defamation since there is no com-
mon law of privacy in Wisconsin.
Still, there are two differences. Privacy is a claim which
survives a wrongful death, while defamation. does not. 169
Also, before filing a defamation suit against a media defend-
ant, a Wisconsin claimant must demand a retraction.170  If
the retraction is forthcoming it can serve as a defense or a
mitigating factor for the defendant. In some states retraction
statutes also apply to false light actions.' 7 1
This like treatment of both torts has come about because
the majority subscribes to Prosser's view that defamation
and false light both harm the same interest in reputation. 72
If privacy were seen as protecting a separate interest, such as
"inviolate personality," perhaps the results would have been
different. 73 In regard to retraction statutes, for example,
once a person has been thrust into the public spotlight by
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (applying the single publication rule to invasion of privacy claims
arising out of mass communications); Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529,
-, 483 P.2d 34, 44, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866, 876 (1971) (holding that the same procedural
prerequisites should apply to defamation and false light). See also FED. R. Civ. P.,
which no longer includes special rules for pleading defamation suits. Formerly, a
plaintiff was required to set forth the interpretation, inducement, innuendo and collo-
quium of a statement which was not defamatory on its face. See W. PROSSER, supra
note 15, § 111, at 746-49. Cf. Wis. STAT. § 802.03(6) (1979) ("In an action for libel or
slander, the particular words complained of shall be set forth in the complaint, but
their publication and their application to the plaintiff may be stated generally.").
167. Wis. STAT. § 893.57 (1979).
168. Id § 895.50(3).
169. Id §§ 895.01(1), .02.
170. Id § 895.05(2).
171. See, e.g., Werner v. Times-Mirror Co., 193 Cal. App. 2d 111, -, 14 Cal.
Rptr. 208, 215-16 (1961).
172. Prosser, supra note 4, at 400. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 559, at 156-58 (1977); Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76
COLUM. L. REv. 1205, 1274-75 (1976); Wade, supra note 63, at 1120.
173. See Bloustein, supra note 45, at 981; Nimmer, supra note 46; Warren &
Brandeis, supra note 18, at 197; Comment, Privacy, Defamation, supra note 46, at 926.
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false publicity, no retraction can mitigate that harm. Even
Prosser recognizes that there are some legitimate false light
claims that would not be cognizable under defamation.1 74 It
is these claims that are now without remedy under Wiscon-
sin law. The possibility of their occurrence raises the ulti-
mate issue of whether the threat to freedom of the press
posed by allowing an action for false light is sufficiently out-
weighed by the potential benefit to citizens who might in-
voke such protection.
d Chilling Effect
The most weighty objection to false light legislation is
that it would result in unnecessary self-censorship and prior
restraint on the part of the press. For this reason the Wis-
consin news media have been vigilant in attempting to pre-
vent any such incursion on their first amendment freedom.
They say that the threat of suits by newsworthy people and
of costly settlements could have a chilling effect on the re-
porting of public affairs. 175
During the legislative hearings on section 895.50 and the
subsequent false light bills, allegations were made that these
measures were being supported by legislators because they
or their influential constituents had been criticized by the
press.176 These people would not be likely to gain any relief
from a false light law since a line of cases in the Supreme
Court, which began with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,'"
requires that a public figure must prove that a statement was
made with "actual malice"17 in order for liability to attach.
This "public figure" category includes any government em-
ployee acting in his official capacity.179 It can also include
anyone who has become the center of a public contro-
174. Prosser, supra note 4, at 400-01.
175. See J. Eakins, supra note 13; P. Salsini, supra note 13, at 14-16.
176. See J. Eakins, supra note 13, at 182.
177. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
178. Id at 279-80, where actual malice is defined as "knowledge that [a state-
ment] was false or [was made] with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."
This is to be distinguished from "common law malice," which means "either personal
ill will toward the plaintiff or reckless or wanton disregard of the plaintiffs rights."
Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 252 (1974).




versy.180 One plurality opinion, Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc. ,1l shifted the focus from the status of the plaintiff by
applying the New York Times standard to all "communica-
tion involving matters of public or general concern, without
regard to whether the persons involved are famous or
anonymous."1 82
The problem with this status test is that unless the plain-
tiff is a public employee or a candidate for office it is uncer-
tain into which class he will fall. Under the Burger Court
the category of "public figure" has been somewhat nar-
rowed. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. ,183 the plaintiff was a
lawyer who had been active in political causes when a maga-
zine accused him of leading a conspiracy to discredit the po-
lice. Yet the Court decided that he had not injected himself
into this particular controversy; therefore, as a private per-
son he only had to prove negligence on the part of the pub-
lisher. 184 In Time, Inc. v. Firestone185 a much publicized
Palm Beach socialite, who held two press conferences during
the course of her divorce proceedings, won a suit against a
magazine which erroneously reported that her husband was
granted a divorce on the grounds of adultery. According to
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion, she was still a private
person because, although the divorce trial aroused wide-
spread public interest, its outcome did not affect the public at
large. 18 6
Two Wisconsin defamation cases illustrate a similar un-
certainty in this state as to how to classify a plaintiff. In
Schaefer v. State Bar 1 7 a widow complained to various
newspapers about the difficulties she was having in probat-
ing her husband's sizeable estate. The State Bar countered
180. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (athletic director paid by
private funds found to be public personality when accused of fixing football game).
181. 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (Brennan, J.).
182. Id at 44. The majority of the Supreme Court never accepted the Rosen-
bloom test. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974). But see supra
notes 106-07 and Wis. STAT. § 895.50(2)(c) (1979), which uses the "matter of public
concern" test to determine whether a disclosure is privileged.
183. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
184. Id at 351-52.
185. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
186. Id at 454-55.
187. 77 Wis. 2d 120, 252 N.W.2d 343 (1977).
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by defending the lawyers involved in a pamphlet which the
widow claimed defamed her. In deciding the case Chief Jus-
tice Beilfuss said that "[b]ecause Mrs. Schaefer has made this
a public issue or matter of public concern, she must prove
actual malice or a reckless or careless disregard for the
truth." 88
Yet in the more recent Denny v. Mertz 8 9 case, an attor-
ney who provided information to a number of publications
in connection with a corporate management dispute was not
found to be a public person. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
said that "the record is clear that Denny's attempts to change
Koehring management were motivated by his desire to pro-
tect his substantial investment in Koehring stock, rather than
to affect the way that corporations are governed."' 90 Ac-
cording to that decision, two tests should be used to deter-
mine "whether a defamation plaintiff may be considered a
public figure": (1) whether there is a controversy of public
nature, impact and interest; and (2) whether the plaintiff has
"voluntarily injected himself into the controversy so as to
influence the resolution of the issues involved."'191 A crucial
consideration of the second test is whether the plaintiff has
access to the media affording him an opportunity to rebut
the defamation and whether by utilizing this access the
plaintiff has assumed the risk of false reportage. 192
The majority concluded that Denny did not fulfill these
criteria for even a limited purpose. But in a dissenting opin-
ion Justice Abrahamson argued that the court had adopted a
"too narrow interpretation of the concept of public
figure."' 93 She pointed out that approximately 11,500 share-
holders own Koehring stock and the corporation employs
nearly 11,000 people at twenty-three plants. "On how many
thousands must the controversy have an impact in order for
188. Id at 125, 252 N.W.2d at 346.
189. 106 Wis. 2d 636, 318 N.W.2d 141 (1982). For a more extensive analysis of
the Denny case, see generally Brody, Defamation Law in Wisconsin, 65 MARQ. L. Rv.
505 (1982).
190. Denny, 106 Wis. 2d at 650, 318 N.W.2d at 148.
191. Id at 649-50, 318 N.W.2d at 147.
192. Id at 650, 318 N.W.2d at 148.
193. Id at 665, 318 N.W.2d at 155 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
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the majority to consider the matter a public controversy?" 194
she asked. Thus, in Denny the majority opinion indicates
that the present court still adheres to vestiges of the Rosen-
bloom public interest test, but will follow the lead of the
United States Supreme Court in narrowly delimiting the
public figure status in defamation cases.195
The majority in Denny also considered the status of the
defendant. They adopted the Gertz standard (negligence)
for private persons defamed by the media, but refused to ex-
tend the same constitutional protections to nonmedia de-
fendants. Instead, under Denny the private defendant is
subject to the common-law standard of strict liability modi-
fied by certain privileges. 196 Justice Abrahamson criticized
this rule as one which would "create a privileged indus-
try"'197 and "a cumbersome route [in many cases] to the ap-
plication of a negligence standard."' 198 Now it appears that
in addition to adjudicating the public versus private plain-
tiffs dilemma, Wisconsin courts must also wrestle with
whether to classify defendants as media or nonmedia.
The United States Supreme Court has demonstrated a
willingness to apply these same defamation tests to false
light cases. In Time, Inc. v. Hill,'99 which arose under the
New York privacy statute, the plaintiff sued Life magazine
for using his name in an article about a new play. The play
was based on an ordeal the Hill family suffered when three
escaped convicts held them hostage in their home overnight.
Although basically true, the play was embellished with inci-
dents of violence and heroism. Mr. Hill had never sought to
connect himself with the play, and had even moved his fam-
ily to another state to put the memory of the incident behind
them. When the Lpfe article revealed the Hills to be the
models for the characters, Mr. Hill brought suit. The New
York Court of Appeals upheld a damage award based on the
194. Id at 667, 318 N.W.2d at 156 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
195. See generally Lauter, Libel Suits: New Wave is Predicted, Nat'l L.J., June 21,
1982, at 1, col. 4.
196. Denny, 106 Wis. 2d at 661, 318 N.W.2d at 153.
197. Id at 673, 318 N.W.2d at 159 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
198. Id at 674-75, 318 N.W.2d at 159 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
199. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
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false elements in the account. 200 The Supreme Court re-
versed and remanded because the jury instructions did not
require a finding of actual malice.20' Although the Hills
were private people who shunned the public eye, the event
itself was deemed sufficiently newsworthy to preclude liabil-
ity on a showing of mere negligence.
A few years later in Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing
Co. 202 a mother and son sued a newspaper and reporter for
a story purporting to describe the impact on their family of
the loss of their husband and father some months before in a
widely publicized bridge collapse. The reporter portrayed
Mrs. Cantrell in unflattering terms even though he had never
seen or interviewed her at the time in question. Relying on
the Gertz formula, Justice Stewart determined that the Can-
trells were not public figures for any purpose; and since the
statements putting them in a false light were made with
knowing or reckless disregard, the plaintiffs were entitled to
compensatory and puniive damages. 03
In Cantrell the plight of the family of the disaster victim
was arguably a matter of public concern 2°4---albeit some-
what outdated after eight months. The return to the status
test in that case raises the question of whether the news-
worthy test of Time, Inc. v. Hill205 still applies in a false light
action. Gertz indicates that it no longer applies in a defama-
tion suit.2 6 No later privacy cases dealing with this issue
have come before the Supreme Court2 7 and the lower courts
200. Hillv. Hayes, 18 A.D.2d 485, 240 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1963), af'd, 15 N.Y.2d 986,
207 N.E.2d 604, 260 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1965), rev'd and remanded sub non Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
201. 385 U.S. at 394-96.
202. 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
203. Id at 250-53.
204. Id at 255 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
205. 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967) (holding that "the constitutional protections for
speech and press preclude the application of the New York statute to redress false
reports of matters of public interest in the absence of proof that the defendant pub-
lished the report with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth.").
206. 418 U.S. at 332-48 (rejecting the public interest test of Rosenbloom v. Me-
tromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971)). It should be remembered that this same "news-
worthy" test as a privilege to public disclosure was incorporated into Wis. STAT.
§ 895.50(2)(c). See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
207. It should be noted that Time, Inc., and Cantrell are right-to-privacy cases
grounded in tort. The action in Time, nc. was predicated on a state statute, while
Cantrell reached the federal courts informapauperls as a diversity action. The two
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are split on the matter. °8 But under either test it is clear that
the press now enjoys more protection for negligent false-
hoods than it had under the common-law rule of strict
liability.20 9
In both Time, Inc. v. Hill and Cantrell the plaintiffs ob-
jected not only to the falsehoods, but also to the violation of
their "right to be let alone." The acts of heroism ascribed to
the plaintiff in Time, Inc. would not be clearly offensive to
most people even if untrue. They were offensive to Mr. Hill
because they invaded the sphere of privacy he had drawn
about himself. The gravamen of that false light offense de-
pended not so much on what was said, but that anything at
all was said about an area of Mr. Hill's life he reasonably
expected to keep private.
e. Guidelines
To date, no Wisconsin civil case has dealt with standards
for determining what a reasonable expectation of privacy
might be, but the press and other interested parties could
discover analogous guidelines in the criminal procedure
cases. In State v. Filyaw,2 1° for example, Justice Coffey
found that the defendant did not have a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in his girlfriend's apartment and upheld his
cases were not grounded upon the constitutional right to privacy recognized by Jus-
tice Douglas' majority opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). That
decision provided the thrust for a line of cases forbidding state interference with inti-
macies involving married life, childbearing and abortion. Later decisions have at-
tempted to confine the constitutional right to privacy to these areas. In Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976), Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, held that an
interest in reputation is not a federally protected right. See also Lehmann, Triangulat-
ing the Limits on the Tort of Invasion of Privacy: The Development of the Remedy in
Light of The Expansion of Constitutional Privilege, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 543, 547-
56 (1976), for a theory of the constitutional underpinnings for the tort of invasion of
privacy.
208. See, e.g., Dresbach v. Doubleday & Co., 518 F. Supp. 1285 (D.D.C. 1981);
Rinsley v. Brandt, 446 F. Supp. 850 (D. Kan. 1977) (holding that only public figures
asserting a false light claim must prove actual malice). But see, e.g., Dodrill v. Arkan-
sas Democrat Co., 265 Ark. 628, 590 S.W.2d 840 (1979) (holding that a nonpublic
figure must also prove actual malice in a false light action if the publication is a
matter of public concern), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1076 (1980). See also Torts, Kentucky
Law Survey, 70 KY. L.J. 527, 544-45 (1981-1982).
209. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (libelous utterances are
"not. . . within the area of constitutionally protected speech .
210. 104 Wis. 2d 700, 312 N.W.2d 795 (1981).
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conviction for her murder based on evidence seized there.
The opinion relies on the two-pronged test of Katz v. United
States2 n which asks: (1) whether the individual has demon-
strated an actual, subjective expectation of privacy, and
(2) whether this subjective expectation is one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable.12 As noted above,21 3 a
false light statement does not have to be of an intimate na-
ture, but this is frequently an aggravating factor.
Despite these privileges and guidelines which favor the
press more than any other profession or business under tort
law, the media still oppose false light legislation because of
their fear of exorbitant judgments. In this field even small
settlements can take their cumulative toll. While insurance
is becoming more common,2 14 small newspapers claim they
cannot afford coverage.215
211. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The Wisconsin Supreme Court also considered the ele-
ments discussed in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140-48 (1981) which are relevant to
the determination of whether one has a legitimate expectation of privacy. The court
said:
[this summary] may be useful to courts in determining the standing of defend-
ants in other cases, although we point out this list of elements is neither con-
trolling nor exclusive:
1. Whether one had a property interest in the premises;
2. Whether one is legitimately (lawfully) on the premises;
3. Whether one had complete dominion and control and the right to ex-
clude others;
4. Whether the person took precautions customarily taken by those seek-
ing privacy;
5. Whether the property was put to some private use;
6. Whether the claim of privacy is consistent with historical notions of
privacy.
104 Wis. 2d at 711-12 n.6, 312 N.W.2d at 801 n.6.
In a concurring opinion Justice Abrahamson argued that:
[a] person can have more than one dwelling and a reasonable expectation of
privacy in each dwelling. Also a person can have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a place other than his own dwelling. A person's privacy can be
protected in a hotel room, a union hall, a phone booth, a business office, a
friend's apartment, a footlocker, and even a taxicab.
Id at 733-34, 312 N.W.2d at 812 (Abrahamson, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
212. 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
213. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
214. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1982, at C17, col. 5, which reports that Viking
Penguin became the first publisher to provide liability insurance for original book
authors. This policy covers invasion of privacy claims among other things.




Under the present section 895.50 a successful plaintiff is
entitled to any of three remedies:
(a) [e]quitable relief to prevent and restrain such inva-
sion, excluding prior restraint... ;
(b) [c]ompensatory damages based either on plaintiffs
loss or defendant's unjust enrichment; and
(c) [a] reasonable amount for attorney fees.216
Compensatory damages are not limited to pecuniary loss
alone;217 the plaintiff may also recover for such things as
emotional distress or personal humiliation, but damages will
"not be presumed in the absence of proof. ' 21 8
It is probable that a prime area of contention concerning
this statute will involve the possibility of recovering punitive
damages. As noted in the legislative history, a clause al-
lowing exemplary damages was deleted from the 1975 ver-
sion of the bill.219 Some writers, including an architect of the
1977 law,220 believe that this precludes any punitive damage
award under the present statute. When introduced in 1977,
however, this bill was silent on the subject 22' and the statute
as enacted is also silent. Whether the 1975 manifestation of
legislative intent is too remote to influence the interpretation
of the present law will be a matter for the courts to deter-
mine. In general, however, when a tort law grants a statu-
tory remedy, the plaintiff is limited to that remedy. For
example, the Wisconsin court has declined to award punitive
damages in a wrongful death action because the wrongful
death statute does not explicitly mention them.222 A few
states, however, construe similar statutes to allow for exem-
plary damages.223 It is probable that the Wisconsin court
will follow the line of reasoning it applied to the wrongful
death statute when it interprets section 895.50, which only
216. Wis. STAT. § 895.50(1) (1979).
217. Id § 895.50(4).
218. Id
219. Wis. A.B. 232 (1975). See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
220. Brody, supra note 106, at 21.
221. Wis. A.B. 216 (1977).
222. Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 315, 294 N.W.2d 437, 464-65
(1980) (construing Wis. STAT. §§ 895.03-.04 (1979)).
223. See J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 5.19, at 55-56 (1981).
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grants compensatory damages.224 Even if punitive damages
were allowed in a privacy action, recovery for both public
and private persons would require a showing of "actual mal-
ice" as decreed by the Gertz225 and Cantrell226 decisions.
With presumed damages and possibly punitive damages
excluded by this statute, media defendants would probably
be faced with lower judgments under a privacy action for
false light than under the alternative remedies of infliction of
mental distress or defamation. If vindication rather than a
large money judgment is his objective, a plaintiff still might
prefer to bring a privacy action because section 895.50 al-
lows an award of attorney fees 227 -a recovery not permitted
in any other tort action in Wisconsin. If the defendant
should prevail, however, the court must determine if the ac-
tion was frivolous. If so, fees and costs may be awarded to
the defendant.228
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on this study it is apparent that false light is not
the threat to fundamental freedom of the press that its critics
fear, but neither is it the panacea for prominent people
wounded by press criticism that its advocates want. At this
stage the fears of the press seem to be somewhat exagger-
ated, while the claims of worthy plaintiffs seem to be few
and far between. Merely because Wisconsin takes the ex-
treme minority position on false light is not sufficient reason
224. Wis. STAT. § 895.50(l)(b) (1979).
225. 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (requiring public figures to prove actual malice in
all cases and requiring all plaintiffs to prove actual malice to collect punitive damages
offers protection to the media). But this test has also led to another threat to press
freedom. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (ruling that public figures must
be given access to the information reporters and editors had gathered on the article or
broadcast in question). See also Downing v. Monitor Publishing Co., 120 N.H. 383,
-, 415 A.2d 683, 686 (1980) (stating that if a newspaper would not reveal its sources,
it could not be presumed to have any defenses). But see Calero v. Del Chemical
Corp., 68 Wis. 2d 487, 510, 228 N.W.2d 737, 750 (1975) (requiring that a private
person prove only common-law malice to collect punitive damages in an action
against a nonmedia defendant).
226. 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
227. Wis. STAT. § 895.50(l)(c) (1979).
228. Id § 895.50(6). This provision exists in addition to Wis. STAT. ANNq.
§ 809.25(3) (West Supp. 1981-1982) (costs upon frivolous appeals) and Wis. STAT.
§ 814.025 (1979) (costs upon frivolous claims and counterclaims).
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in itself to rush to plug the statutory gap.229 It is arguable
that Wisconsin courts have the authority to recognize the
false light tort based on a common-law recognition of prece-
dents in other jurisdictions. If a particularly worthy claim-
ant should appear, this would be preferable to a repeat of the
Yoecke1230 situation. Meanwhile, lawmakers have the lux-
ury of allowing the states of Nebraska 23I and Rhode Is-
land232 with their false light statutes to serve as laboratories
for observing the practical results of enacting such a law.233
This will give the legislature an opportunity to evaluate and
balance societal interests based on actual, not hypothetical,
data before taking action.
As the symbolic year of 1984 approaches, the right of pri-
vacy as conceived nearly a century ago by Warren and Bran-
deis is a subject of increasing concern to citizens of the
United States. The mechanical devices Warren and Bran-
deis feared were only bulky cameras. Today, micro-
technology and computerized data banks2 3 4 have expanded
the means of invading privacy while making those means
more invisible and, thus, more insidious. The country is also
at the threshold of fundamental change in the communica-
tions industry. Newspapers are merging or shutting down,
while channels on the airwaves are expanding. If these de-
velopments result in increased threats to individual privacy,
229. See United States v. Twelve 200 Foot Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 127
(1972), where Chief Justice Burger warns of this process when he says:
The seductive plausibility of single steps in a chain of evolutionary develop-
ment of a legal rule is often not perceived until a third, fourth, or fifth "logi-
cal" extension occurs. Each step, when taken, appeared a reasonable step in
relation to that which preceded it, although the aggregate or end result is one
that would never have been seriously considered in the first instance. This
kind of gestative propensity calls for the "line drawing" familiar in the judi-
cial, as in the legislative process: "thus far but not beyond."
230. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
231. See NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 20-201 to -211 (Supp. 1980).
232. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-28.1 (Supp. 1981).
233. See Comment, The Right to Privacy in Nebraska, 13 CREIGHTON L. REv.
935, 945 (1980) (concluding that "[t]he false light action created by section 20-204,
when considered together with the existing actions for defamation, adds little to a
Nebraska plaintiff's remedies").
234. See A. MILLER, supra note 65, at 184 (calling false light "the only one of
Dean Prosser's categories that even remotely suggests the type of sensitive analysis
that is necessary to come to grips with the range of subtle injuries that can be inflicted
in an information-based society").
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the legislature will have to enlarge the legal remedy for inva-
sion now available in Wisconsin.
JACQUELINE HANSON DEE
